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“Please Don’t Stop the Music”: The Need for
Fairness in Digital Copyright
Adam Vukovic*
Each month, over 100 million Americans listen to and discover music through Internet
radio stations. Section 114 of the Copyright Act requires Internet radio stations, as
providers of digital radio transmissions, to pay performance royalties. Due to an
outdated royalty determination method, these Internet radio stations regularly spend
over half of their revenue to secure royalties for the songs streamed through their
websites—far more than paid by digital radio stations. The Internet Radio Fairness Act
sought to equalize the royalty rates paid by Internet radio services and their digital
counterparts. Unfortunately, due to fierce lobbying, the bill has been abandoned and
Internet radio stations continue to face challenges to securing fair and reasonable
royalty rates. This Note first seeks to explore the history of U.S. copyright legislation to
better understand how we have reached such disparate royalty determination methods.
Subsequently, this Note considers the arguments against uniform digital radio royalty
schemes and discusses how the abandonment of the Internet Radio Fairness Act was a
missed opportunity as passage of the Act would have provided Internet radio stations
with the financial flexibility required to make technological advancements that could
benefit all relevant parties.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. I would like to thank the
dedicated editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their enthusiastic support, thoughtful feedback, and
tireless “blue-booking” of this Note.
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Introduction
In November 1994, Mick Jagger and The Rolling Stones performed
1
the first major concert broadcasted over the Internet. Jagger opened this
landmark event by stating: “I wanna say a special welcome to everyone
that’s, uh, climbed into the Internet tonight and, uh, has got into the M2
bone. And I hope it doesn’t all collapse.” Fortunately, Jagger’s concerns
were misplaced; the Internet did not cave in on itself and has since
become a significant music broadcasting platform, with Internet-based
3
radio services reaching an estimated 103 million listeners per month.
While the traditional, terrestrial radio format might reach a larger
number of people, the music played is determined by radio stations that

1. Peter H. Lewis, Peering Out a ‘Real Time’ Window, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1995, at D1.
2. Id. The “M-bone,” as it was called, refers to the “multicast backbone, which functions as a
network based on the Internet’s framework.” Id.
3. Arbitron Inc. & Edison Research, The Infinite Dial 2012: Navigating Digital Platforms
8 (2012). These 103 million monthly listeners account for approximately thirty-nine percent of the U.S.
population aged twelve or older. Id.
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tend to favor more popular songs promoted by large record companies;
4
independent and obscure artists are rarely represented. Internet radio
5
stations like Pandora present a great opportunity for these aspiring
musicians. To begin, fans of a specific music genre choose their favorite
artists, then the Internet radio station plays the music, sharing similar
6
elements with the artist initially selected, and allowing music fans the
opportunity to discover new artists they might enjoy. This has potential
to create a diverse fan base that can purchase music, merchandise, and
concert tickets. Internet radio services allow the listener to eschew the
musical preferences of traditional radio programmers and record label
7
executives in favor of music that better aligns with her personal taste. In
essence, Internet radio has connected less prominent musicians, unable
to secure national radio airplay, with people who will appreciate their
art. Just as important to aspiring musicians is the way in which Internet
radio has affected their copyright interests.
The production of every piece of music brings with it two separate
8
copyrightable works: a musical composition and a sound recording. A
musical composition consists of the musical notes and lyrics put together
by the composer, while the sound recording is made up of the recording
9
or singing of that music composition as a whole. Typically, the composer
owns the copyright to the musical composition and the record label owns
10
the copyright to the sound recording. When a song is played over the
Internet, it involves the performance of both the musical composition
and the sound recording, therefore triggering both copyright protections
11
inherent in a piece of music. In contrast, when a song is played over
traditional AM/FM radio, the only copyright affected is that of the
12
musical composition. This distinction is crucial in determining how
different radio broadcasters pay royalties.
4. See, e.g., Clyde Smith, Indie Artists Share How They Got Radio Airplay, What It Meant for Their
Careers, Hypebot (June 5, 2012), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2012/06/earbits-breaking-into-fmradio.html (various independent artists discussing the difficulties of obtaining mainstream radio airplay
without the assistance of a large recording label providing marketing and public relations support).
5. See Arbitron Inc. & Edison Research, supra note 3, at 24.
6. This is the method used by Pandora, one of the most prevalent Internet radio services. See
Rob Walker, The Song Decoders, N.Y. Times Magazine, Oct. 18, 2009, at 48. Pandora employs
“musicologists” who pore over the technical (beats per minute, octaves, chords) and the subjective
(how happy is this song?) aspects of individual songs. Id. The results of this analysis are used to suggest
artists and songs that share similar qualities to those artists chosen by the user at the outset. Id.
7. See id.
8. See Karen Fessler, Note, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 399, 401 (2003)
(“Recorded songs . . . typically consist of two separate copyrightable works: the ‘musical work,’ the
series of notes and lyrics that a composer creates, and the ‘sound recording,’ the actual sound of a
performance of those notes and lyrics.”).
9. William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep 39–41 (2004).
10. See Fessler, supra note 8, at 401; see also Joanna Demers, Steal This Music 22 (2006).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4), 106(6) (2012).
12. See Fessler, supra note 8, at 401.
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Traditional radio providers are only required to pay publishing
royalties to the composer of a particular song played on the air, not the
13
owner of the copyright in the sound recording. Digital radio providers,
on the other hand, must also pay the performance fee for the sound
14
recording in addition to the publishing royalty paid to the composer.
Digital radio providers are required to pay these performance fees under
section 114 of Copyright Act. The Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”)
determines the amount of these fees, using different techniques to
15
calculate the amount due based on the broadcast method employed.
This has resulted in a great disparity between the fees paid by Internet
radio providers, like Pandora, and those paid by cable or satellite
16
providers, like Sirius XM.
On September 21, 2012, Congressman Jason Chaffetz introduced
17
the Internet Radio Fairness Act (“IRFA”). This bipartisan bill sought
to level the playing field between Internet radio providers and their
18
digital counterparts. However, the IRFA stalled and has not been
19
reintroduced. The bill seems all but dead, with Internet radio
heavyweight Pandora abandoning the legislation and now considering
20
lobbying the CRB directly.
This Note explores the history of digital copyright in order to help
understand how we have reached this disconnect between rates paid by
satellite radio providers and those paid by Internet radio providers. The
current approach, in which the CRB determines the royalties owed based
on the type of technology used, is misguided. The adoption of a method
for determining rates consistent with those proposed by the Internet
Fairness Radio Act—using the same standard regardless of whether the
digital music is provided through satellite or the Internet—is ideal
because it would allow Internet radio to compete fairly with its digital
radio counterpart. The music industry is shifting again, this time away
21
from digital music sales and toward digital streaming. If royalty rates

13. Id. Traditional radio broadcasters were able to avoid sound recording royalties because of the
presence of their powerful lobbying body, the National Association of Broadcasters. Id. at 402 n.15.
14. See id. at 401–02.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 114; see also discussion infra Part II.C.
16. See, e.g., Aidin Vaziri, Pandora’s Box: The Cost of ‘Free’ Music, S.F. Chron., Nov. 30, 2012, at
A1. In 2011, Pandora claims to have paid fifty-four percent of revenue to record companies and artists,
whereas Sirius is reported to have only paid eight percent. Id. It should be noted that Sirius is a
subscription-based service, whereas users can listen to Pandora for free.
17. Boost Innovation with Fair and Equal Internet Radio Royalties, Congressman Jason Chaffetz
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://chaffetz.house.gov/chaffetz-boost-innovation-fair-and-equal-internet-radio-royalties.
18. Id.
19. See Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong.
20. See Glenn Peoples, TKO or Split Decision? The Recording Industry Might Have Scored a Big Win
as Pandora Stands Down on Legislative Push for Royalty Rate Reform, Billboard, Nov. 30, 2013, at 5.
21. See Ed Christman, The Digital Decline, Billboard, Jan. 18, 2014, at 34. Individual digital
track sales fell 5.7% in 2013, the first such decline since the introduction of the iTunes store. Id.
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were consistent across all digital radio formats, webcasters could take
advantage of leftover revenue to increase innovation and further connect
music lovers with artists they might not yet know.
This Note argues that a more manageable royalty rate would allow
webcasters to grow and improve their services, thus attracting more users
and in turn increasing royalty fees and exposure for the artists. Part I
provides a background of digital copyright law. Part II discusses the
current digital copyright standards and royalty schedules as determined
by the CRB. Part III disputes the arguments against the Internet radio
model, discusses the opportunity missed by abandoning the IRFA, and
explains the need for a level playing field between all digital radio
providers regardless of their transmission method.

I. History of Digital Copyright: 1909 to 1998
The 1710 Statute of Anne in England, which served as a model for
early U.S. copyright law, was the first statute to provide authors with
22
copyright protection. In addition to protecting authors of written works,
the purpose of the statute was to “enhance public welfare by encouraging
23
the dissemination of knowledge.” Similarly, the U.S. Constitution
empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts” by providing authors and inventors copyright protection for their
24
work.
A. The Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1909
25

Pursuant to the grant of authority in the Copyright Clause,
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1790, the first in the United
26
States. Similar to the 1710 Statute of Anne in England, the 1790 Act
provided protection for works written by American authors for two
27
terms of fourteen years each. From the enactment of the 1790 Act until
28
1909, federal copyright law underwent some general revisions. In 1831,
29
for example, musical compositions became copyrightable. In 1905,

22. Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 4 (4th ed. 2005). See, e.g., Statute of
Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
23. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 5. The full title of the 1710 Statute of Anne: “An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of
such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.” Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Id.
26. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 6–7.
27. Id. at 7. These two fourteen-year terms included the original grant of protection and an
optional renewal term. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7 n.23.
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President Theodore Roosevelt called for a complete revision of federal
30
copyright law to better address advances in technology.
In response to this call for revision, the Librarian of Congress
“invited representatives of authors, dramatists, painters, sculptors,
architects, composers, photographers, publishers, . . . and printers’ unions
31
to a series of meetings” to overhaul the existing copyright law. The
initial draft afforded music copyright owners “the exclusive right to make
or sell any mechanical device that reproduced work in sounds,”
effectively giving composers an unfair bargaining advantage over the
32
piano roll and phonograph manufacturers. Perhaps this can be explained
by the fact that representatives of the latter industries, whose services and
instruments were essential to the reproduction and performance of musical
33
compositions, were not included in these meetings.
To counteract this legislation, representatives of the piano roll and
phonograph industries introduced separate bills that addressed their
34
concerns, but they were unable to reach a vote. At this point, the
songwriters’ and composers’ representatives suggested that the
35
concerned parties negotiate separately. As a result of these separate
36
negotiations, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909. During these
discussions, the interested parties came to agree that the 1909 Act would
not include protection for the performance right of musical compositions
37
on mechanical devices. Instead, Congress granted artists “a compulsory
38
license for mechanical reproductions of music.”
Following the adoption of these new laws, composers and artists
needed representation to protect their newly established rights. In 1914,
the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(“ASCAP”) formed to protect music creators’ rights and ensure that the
39
creators were fairly compensated for public performances of their work.

30. Id. at 7.
31. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 39 (2001).
32. Id. The initial draft that resulted from these meetings would have made the unlicensed
manufacturing of piano roll and phonographs illegal. Id. In essence, only the copyright owner would
have been able to produce the instruments and equipment that could play their music.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 39–40.
35. Id. at 40.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. A compulsory license allows a party to make and distribute a copy of an artist’s
copyrighted work, provided the work has been previously distributed to the public under the copyright
holder’s authority. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012). In lieu of negotiating directly with the copyright
holder, the user may make and distribute copies of the work once she has paid the compulsory license
as determined by law or arbitration. Id.
39. See Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal Theoretical Reasons Supporting the
Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 83, 89–90 (2009). ASCAP is still active,
representing over 450,000 American composers, artists, and music publishers across all genres of
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Shortly after formation, ASCAP succeeded in its first appearance before
40
the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Shanley Co. There, the Supreme Court
decided that music could not be played as background music in
restaurants unless the restaurant owner paid a royalty to the music’s
41
copyright holder. More specifically, when a business operating for profit
played the musical work of another, that performance constituted a
42
public performance that required compensation.
Herbert shed light on some of the troubles with the 1909 Act. Even
though the Act granted copyright owners a broad range of rights, many
uses of copyrighted works still did not require the users to pay the
43
copyright holder. For example, artists other than the copyright owner
could use musical recordings so long as the performance was not
44
45
“public.” The term “public” was not defined in the 1909 Act.
Furthermore, these performances could be made “public” so long as they
46
were not for “profit,” but Congress declined to define “profit.”
By the mid-twentieth century, it became clear that the Copyright
47
Act of 1909 had become outdated and was in need of repair. The 1909
Act was written to accommodate the media and arts before radio,
48
movies, and television became prevalent. Recognizing this, Congress
49
authorized the revision of copyright law in 1955. After more than
twenty years of reports and hearings, congressional revisions culminated
50
in the Copyright Act of 1976.
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
51

The Copyright Act of 1976 completely overhauled copyright law. It
provided copyright holders five distinct rights: “the rights to reproduce

music. See generally, About ASCAP, American Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
http://www.ascap.com/about (last visited June 1, 2014).
40. 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
41. Id. at 594–95.
42. Id.
43. Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 856, 863 (1978).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 9.
48. Litman, supra note 31, at 28. At the time, copyright law was “frozen in the form it had taken
in 1912.” Id. at 49. Radio programs, movies, television shows, and other new forms of media were
afforded copyright protection “only to the extent they could be analogized to the statutory list of
works subject to copyright, and received rights whose scope was limited by the category in which they
best fit.” Id.
49. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 9.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., WGN Cont’l. Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“The comprehensive overhaul of copyright law by the Copyright Act of 1976 was impelled by recent
technological advances, such as xerography and cable television, which the courts interpreting the
prior act . . . had not dealt with to Congress’s satisfaction.”).
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and adapt the copyrighted work, and to distribute, perform, and display
52
it publicly.” Additionally, it provided for federal preemption in the field
53
of copyright law. As Robert A. Gorman noted:
From the moment that the author’s pen imprints words on foolscap, or
the composer’s pen makes musical markings on blank notation paper,
or the artist puts brush and oil to canvas, the work has become in the
constitutional sense a “Writing” and is, pursuant to the 1976 Act,
covered by federal copyright—with federal court jurisdiction, federal
substantive rules and federal remedies—and state law equivalent to
54
copyright is completely ousted from operation.

The 1976 Act also triggered the creation of the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, an independent agency responsible for setting the compulsory
55
statutory licensing rates for the five enumerated rights. Tribunal
members, appointed by the President, would also adjudicate disputes
56
arising out of those licensing rates. The CRB has since replaced the
57
Copyright Royalty Tribunal.
Most notably, the 1976 Act granted the public performance right for
58
the underlying composition only, and not for the sound recording.
Therefore, the holders of the sound recording copyright—usually
recording companies—did not receive compensation when someone
59
performed the sound recordings in a public venue. Radio broadcasters
resisted awarding a performance right for sound recordings for fear of
60
being charged twice for broadcasting a copyrighted song. At the time,
record companies neglected to push for sound recording royalties, and
were simply satisfied that playing the music on traditional radio stations
would result in increased record sales, touring revenue, and the sale of
61
promotional materials. The 1976 Act remained mostly untouched until
62
the United States entered the Berne Union in 1988.

52. See Leaffer, supra note 22, at 10; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
53. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 10.
54. Gorman, supra note 43, at 865.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 801.
56. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 294.
57. Id. at 294–95. In 1993, Congress replaced the Copyright Royalty Tribunal with the Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels (“CARPs”). Id. at 295. However, Congress abolished the “expensive and
inefficient” CARP system in 2004, and it was replaced by three full-time copyright royalty judges who
make up the CRB. Id.
58. Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2009).
59. Id.
60. Neil Conley, The Future of Licensing Music Online: The Role of Collective Rights
Organizations and the Effect of Territoriality, 25 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 409, 417–18
(2008). Recall that a song contains two distinct copyrights: the composition and the sound recording,
which are typically controlled by two different parties. The traditional radio broadcasters used their
influential lobbying power to avoid having to pay for both performance rights in one song. See Fessler,
supra note 8, at 402 n.15 (citations omitted).
61. See Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 152. The court in Arista noted that “[t]he reason for this lack of
copyright protection in sound recordings . . . was that the ‘recording industry and [radio] broadcasters
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C. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
In March 1988, the United States became a signatory to the Berne
Convention, “the largest and most important international copyright
63
convention.” To bring our copyright law in line with the Berne
Convention, Congress enacted the Berne Convention Implementation
64
Act of 1988 (“BCIA”). Most significantly, the BCIA modified
“formalities such as notice, registration, and recordation as conditions of
65
copyright protection.”
Following the enactment of the BCIA, Congress further amended
66
the 1976 Act by granting rights to visual artists, protecting architectural
67
68
works, and banning direct and indirect rental of computer software. In
1995, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
(“DPRA”) created a sixth right under section 106: the right to publicly
69
perform a sound recording by digital transmission. In doing so, sound
recording copyright owners received protection from unauthorized
70
digital performances of their work. Just three years later, advancements
in digital media transmission required the Copyright Act to undergo
further changes.
D. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
In 1997, the music industry was up in arms over rampant copyright
71
infringement by peer-to-peer networks, such as Napster and Grokster.
These file-sharing networks allegedly cost the music industry one million
72
dollars per day. During its attempt to combat piracy, the music industry
also turned its attention toward webcasting, or non-subscription based
73
Internet radio. The music industry feared that “[i]f an internet user
existed in a sort of symbiotic relationship wherein the recording industry recognized that radio airplay
was free advertising that lured consumers to retail stores where they would purchase recordings.’” Id.
62. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 11.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2) (2012).
67. See id. § 102(a)(8).
68. See id. § 109(b).
69. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 13. A digital transmission is “a transmission in whole or in part in a
digital or other non-analog format.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
70. Leaffer, supra note 22, at 13–14. Leaffer refers to this protection of sound recordings as a
“step toward bringing the protection of sound recordings under copyright into rough parity with that
afforded to other kinds of works.” Id. at 13.
71. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901–02 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part by 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Napster and Grokster are file-sharing
programs that allow members to exchange music files through a “peer-to-peer” network. Much to the
chagrin of the music industry, all files were traded over the network for free.
72. Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 2009).
73. Id. at 150. A webcaster is considered an eligible non-subscription transmission “if the primary
purpose of the service is to provide to the public such audio or other entertainment programming, and
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could listen to music broadcast over, or downloaded from, the internet
74
for free . . . the user would stop purchasing music.” In response to these
growing concerns, the music industry began lobbying for a congressional
75
amendment to the DPRA.
Music industry lobbyists argued that non-subscription webcasters
should also pay the extra licensing fee already imposed on the
76
subscription-based web services covered under the DPRA. The
webcasters responded by forming the Digital Media Association
(“DiMA”), a lobbying and trade organization, for the purpose of
77
representing Internet radio’s interests. Shortly after the formation of
78
DiMA, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) became law.
The DMCA primarily addressed the music industry’s piracy and
sales concerns by expanding the copyright owners’ performance right in
sound recordings to cover recordings broadcast by non-subscription
79
webcasters. Terrestrial broadcasters retained their exemption from
paying royalties on traditional broadcasts, but were later required to also
pay the digital broadcasting fee whenever those stations’ broadcasts were
80
simulcast over the Internet.

II. Where We Stand Now: The Current Digital Copyright Regime
Before discussing why digital copyright law should not take the
technology used when delivering digital music into consideration, it is
essential to understand how royalty rates are determined across the
the primary purpose of the service is not to sell, advertise, or promote particular products or services
other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events.” David Nimmer, Ignoring
the Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 189, 238 (2000) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6)).
74. Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 153. Jason Berman, president of the Recording Industry
Association of America, expressed concern that without a copyright in a right of performance via
Internet technology, the industry would be “unable to compete in this emerging digital era.” Id.
75. Id. at 153–54.
76. Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We Figure
Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 1, 12–13 (2001). The DPRA, for example, required “webcasters offering subscription music
services . . . to pay two licensing fees to both publisher and record company for the copyrighted
musical work as well as the copyrighted sound recording.” Id. at 6.
77. See generally, Jonathan Potter, Keynote Remarks at the Digital Music Forum, Digital Media
Ass’n (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.digmedia.org/component/content/article/41-speeches/113-speeches.
In his keynote address, Jonathan Potter, the founder and then-executive director of DiMA, described
the formation of DiMA as being led by “a handful of companies that were passionately focused on
developing innovative online opportunities and new commercial markets for creators, recording
companies and consumers.” Id. At the time of this address, those companies included media
heavyweights such as Apple, Yahoo, AOL, and Amazon. Id.
78. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The DMCA was effective upon enactment on October 28, 1998. Id.
79. Nimmer, supra note 73, at 238–39.
80. See Booneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 495 (3d Cir. 2003) (declaring that an AM/FM
webcast does not qualify for exemption from the digital audio transmission performance copyright).
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different digital radio platforms. Subpart A discusses the basics of music
copyright. Subpart B lists the prevailing performance rights organizations
(“PROs”) and describes their place in determining digital copyright
royalty rates. Subpart C discusses the compulsory licenses created by the
DMCA, as codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 114. Subpart D examines the
rates paid by satellite radio providers, while Subpart E examines those
paid by Internet radio providers.
A. Copyrightable Music
As previously discussed, each piece of music entails two separate
pieces of copyrightable work: a musical composition and a sound
81
recording. The owners of these two types of copyrights have the
exclusive right to do and authorize the following: reproduce their work,
make derivative works based upon their composition or sound
82
recordings, and distribute their protected work. Only the owner of the
musical composition has the right to publicly perform her protected work
and, as a result, collect royalties when someone else performs this music
83
publicly. However, as discussed in Subpart B, the DPRA created a sixth
right under 17 U.S.C. § 106, providing the copyright owner of a sound
recording with protection from unauthorized performance over a digital
84
transmission. Therefore, owners of a sound recording copyright are
entitled to royalties when their music is played over Internet, satellite, or
85
cable radio.
B. Performance Rights Organizations
Under the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office is responsible for
designating a nonprofit PRO as the copyright holders’ statutory
86
representative. Instead of negotiating directly with the copyright holder,
interested “buyers” interact with the PROs, which then determine the
87
cost of licensing. PROs are also responsible for receiving royalty
88
payments made by webcasters under the DMCA. The statutory
89
representative, SoundExchange, is responsible for setting licensing fees

81. Fessler, supra note 8, at 401.
82. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3) (2012).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4); see id. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not
include any right of performance under section 106(4).”). See Fisher, supra note 9, at 40–41.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
85. See id.
86. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2899–901 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). A statutory representative collects the rates as required
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 114.
87. Id.
88. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
89. Advocacy, SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com/advocacy (last visited June 1, 2014).
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and collecting royalties for the use of sound recordings. If providers
negotiating with SoundExchange are not satisfied with the proposed
91
statutory rate, the rates are then reviewed by the CRB.
Each public performance of a musical composition also requires a
92
license from the composition’s copyright owner. Three private PROs in
the United States are responsible for the facilitation of licenses and the
collection and distribution of royalties for the public performance of a
musical composition: ASCAP, Broadcast Music Incorporated (“BMI”),
93
and SESAC.
These PROs “issue ‘blanket’ performance licenses for all the songs
in their catalogues to radio and television stations” in exchange for the
94
payment of a single fee to each organization. Broadcast radio stations
have agreed to pay a flat percentage of their gross revenue—around two
95
percent—to the PROs. ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC have also
established rates for the performance of a musical composition over a
96
digital broadcast. ASCAP, for example, requires a minimum annual fee
of $288 and $340 for non-interactive and interactive new media
97
broadcasts, respectively. After paying this fee, webcasters can opt into
98
one of three rate schedules that best fit their business model. The rate
that an Internet radio webcaster pays for the public performance of a
musical composition is significantly lower than what is paid for the public
performance of the sound recording.
C. Section 114 and Section 112: Sound Recording Royalties
The DMCA, and the DPRA before it, created compulsory licenses
99
for the digital transmission of music. In order to “perform” a song over
the Internet, one must obtain three licenses: (1) a license for the public
performance of the musical composition (as paid to the PROs discussed
100
above), (2) a license for the public performance of the sound recording

90. Id.
91. 112 Stat. at 2827.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
93. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 50.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. New Media Rate Calculator, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/mylicense/newmedia/
glsnewmediaratecalc.aspx (last visited June 1, 2014). A “non-interactive” webcast is one that mimics a
traditional radio broadcast in that the listener has no control over the programming. See Licensing 101,
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/licensing-101 (last visited June 1,
2014). An interactive webcast is just the opposite: the user compiles his or her own playlist.
98. See, e.g., ASCAP, supra note 97.
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012).
100. Id.
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101

to be transmitted by digital means, and (3) a license for the creation of
102
ephemeral copies of the sound recording.
Section 114 creates a compulsory license for the digital performance
103
of sound recordings. It also dictates how the CRB is to determine the
104
cost of these licenses. The CRB uses two different techniques to
determine § 114 royalties: (1) the § 801(b)(1) standard for digital cable
105
radio and satellite radio, and (2) the “willing buyer-willing seller”
106
standard for Internet radio. Section 112 creates the compulsory license
for the creation of ephemeral copies of songs transmitted via digital
107
means. These licenses are meant to compensate the owner of the sound
recording copyright for the one time it is required to “copy” a song in
108
order to transmit it digitally. Section 112 instructs the CRB to determine
109
rates using the “willing buyer-willing seller” standard as well.
The Copyright Office designated SoundExchange to be the
110
recipient and distributor of these sound recording royalties.
SoundExchange purports to represent more than 28,000 record labels
111
and 90,000 recording artists. Under section 114, sound recording
royalties are distributed as follows: fifty percent to the holder of the
copyright (usually the record label), forty-five percent to the featured
artists, and the remaining five percent for any non-featured artists (back
112
up vocalists and musicians). In 2012, SoundExchange reported that it
collected and distributed $462 million in sound recording royalties, an

101. Id. § 114.
102. Id. § 112. An ephemeral copy refers to the temporary copy of a sound recording that is made
in the digital transmission process; as data is transmitted from server to server, the copies reside in
the memory of a server for a very short period of time. See SoundExchange, supra note 97.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 114.
104. The CRB replaced the Copyright Royalty Tribunal that existed under the Copyright Act of
1976. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).
106. See id. § 114(f)(2)(B) (“[T]he [CRB] shall establish rates and terms that most clearly
represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing
buyer and a willing seller.”). This “willing buyer-willing seller” standard has created a great disparity
in the rates paid by satellite radio providers and Internet radio providers and is the focus of Part II.E.
See, e.g., Vaziri, supra note 16. In 2011, Pandora paid royalties to the tune of fifty-four percent of
revenue, whereas Sirius XM paid approximately eight percent of revenue towards royalties. Id.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 112.
108. Id. § 112(a).
109. Id. § 112(e)(4). Section 112 rates are so minimal that they are considered absorbed by the
rates due under section 114.
110. Notice of Designation as Collective Under Statutory License, U.S. Copyright Office,
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/notice-designation-collective.pdf (last visited June 1, 2014).
111. See
SoundExchange,
2012
Annual
Review
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2012-Annual-Review.pdf.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2).
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113

all-time record. As providers of digital audio transmissions, satellite
radio and Internet radio companies paid into this record pot of $462
114
million. However, because of the different standards used to determine
royalty rates based upon the digital service, their contributions can turn
115
out quite differently.
D. Satellite Radio Rates and the § 801(b)(1) Standard
Satellite radio has far greater broadcast capabilities than traditional
116
AM/FM radio. SiriusXM is the most recognizable name in the satellite
117
radio industry. In 2012, SiriusXM announced that it had nearly twenty118
four million subscribers, a 9.5% year-over-year gain. SiriusXM credits
this expansive listener base to its strong relationships with original
119
equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”). For example, SiriusXM satellite
radio components are available pre-installed in an estimated seventy
120
percent of new cars sold in the United States. In January 2012,
121
SiriusXM raised its subscription fee almost twelve percent, to $14.99.
Its total revenue for 2012 was $3.4 billion, a thirteen-percent increase
122
from 2011. It is from this revenue that satellite radio providers like
SiriusXM must pay sound recording licensing royalties.
Licensing royalties for the performance of sound recordings via
satellite radio are determined using the objectives set forth in 17 U.S.C.

113. SoundExchange Ends Record-Setting Year with $462 Million in Total Distributions,
SoundExchange (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.soundexchange.com/pr/soundexchange-endsrecord-setting-year-with-462-million-in-total-distributions. This total represents a fifty-eight percent
increase in distributions from the previous year. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Vaziri, supra note 16.
116. What is SiriusXM, SiriusXM, http://www.siriusxm.com/whatissiriusxm (last visited June 1,
2014). SiriusXM boasts over three million square miles of satellite radio coverage. Id. In contrast,
traditional AM/FM radio stations are only accessible within a range of 50 to 100 miles. Id.
117. SiriusXM is the result of a merger between two formerly competing satellite radio providers:
Sirius Satellite Radio and XM Satellite Radio. See Olag Kharif, The FCC Approves the XM-Sirius
Merger, Business Week (July 25, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-25/
the-fcc-approves-the-xm-sirius-mergerbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
118. Zacks Equity Research, Sirius XM Gains Huge Subscribers, Yahoo! Finance (Oct. 11, 2012,
1:44 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/sirius-xm-gains-huge-subscribers-174422700.html.
119. Id. An OEM manufactures products or components for a different company to be sold under
the purchasing company’s name or within its own products. See IBM, Dictionary of IBM and
Computing Technology 66 (2014). Sirius XM comes standard in a wide array of new vehicles being
sold
in
the
U.S.
market.
See,
e.g.,
Automotive
Partners
A-K,
SiriusXM,
http://www.siriusxm.com/automakers/vehicle (last visited June 1, 2014). These OEMs are building
satellite capable radios directly into their cars. See id.
120. Zacks Equity Research, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. Glen Peoples, Sirius XM Posts Record Revenue, Talks About Upcoming Internet Radio
Service, Billboard (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-andmobile/1537928/sirius-xm-posts-record-revenue-talks-about-upcoming.
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123

§ 801(b)(1). Section 801(b)(1) directs the Copyright Royalty Board to
calculate royalties to achieve four objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work
and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic
conditions;
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect
to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets
for creative expression and media for their communication;
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the
124
industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.

Thus, the § 801(b)(1) standard seeks to balance the interests of all
parties affected by the copyright process: copyright owners, copyright
users, and the public. The § 801(b)(1) standard takes into account the
creative impact of copyrightable work, whereas the “willing buyer-willing
seller standard” focuses only on the hypothetical marketplace between
125
the copyright owner and copyright user.
As digital radio providers, satellite radio stations like SiriusXM
must pay the sound recording royalties set out in 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 and
126
114. However, when determining the rates to be paid by satellite radio
127
providers, § 114 instructs the CRB to use the § 801(b)(1) standard. The
CRB determines the royalties to be paid by Satellite Digital Audio
128
Radio Services for a set term of four years. In 2013, the CRB, using the
§ 801(b)(1) standard, set the rates as follows: 9% of gross revenue for
129
2013; 9.5% for 2014; 10% for 2015; 10.5% for 2016; and 11% for 2017.
When compared to the royalty rates paid by Internet radio providers,
many of which provide their services free of charge or for a subscription
fee, satellite radio providers are receiving a far better deal than their
Internet counterparts.

123. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B) (2012).
124. Id. § 801(b)(1).
125. See id. § 114(f)(2)(B).
126. See id. §§ 112, 114.
127. Id. § 114(f)(1).
128. See id. §§ 114(f)(1)(B), 801(b)(1).
129. Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital
Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 23,071 (Apr. 17, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 382).
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E. Internet Radio Rates and the “Willing Buyer-Willing Seller”
Standard
1.

Copyright Royalty Board Rate Decision for 2011 to 2015

In December of 2010, the CRB announced the webcasting royalty
rates to be paid under §§ 112 and 114 for the term beginning January 1,
130
2011, and ending December 31, 2015. The rates are as follows: $0.0019
per performance in 2011; $0.0021 in 2012; $0.0021 in 2013; $0.0023 in
131
2014; and $0.0023 in 2015. These rates are assessed in addition to the
132
minimum fee of $500 per channel or station, with a cap of $50,000.
The CRB reached these annual rates using the “willing buyer133
willing seller” standard set forth in § 114(f)(2)(B). In hearings during
the rate determination process, Live365, an Internet radio provider,
presented an expert witness, economist Mark Fratrik, who misconstrued
134
the standard. Fratrik argued that a “willing buyer” is one who would
only be willing to buy a license if the price would allow the buyer to earn
at least a twenty percent profit margin from the use of that sound
135
recording. The CRB, however, dismissed this analysis, claiming that
such a profit margin from the use of sound recording would likely only
be obtained by a terrestrial broadcaster, and was therefore not
136
representative of a “willing buyer” in the webcasting market.
Instead, the CRB outlined in its rate determination how it
interpreted the “willing buyer-willing seller” standard as codified in the
Copyright Act:
The willing buyer/willing seller standard in the Copyright Act
encompasses consideration of economic, competitive and programming
information presented by the parties, including (1) the promotional or
substitution effects of the use of webcasting services by the public on
the sales of phonorecords or other effects of the use of webcasting that
may interfere with or enhance the sound recording copyright owner’s
other streams of revenue from its sound recordings; and (2) the relative

130. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 76 Fed. Reg.
13,026, 13,036 (Mar. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
131. Id. A “performance” is defined as a single song streamed to a single listener. Determination
of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services,
78 Fed. Reg. at 23,099. Thus, if ten people were to listen to a webcaster broadcasting only one song it
would be counted as ten performances.
132. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,028. In August of 2007, SoundExchange and DiMA announced an
agreement to cap the minimum annual fee at $50,000. See David Oxenford, Congress to Return—Will
Internet Radio Royalties Be on Its Agenda, Broadcast Law Blog (Aug. 29, 2007),
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2007/08/articles/internet-radio/congress-to-return-will-internetradio-royalties-be-on-its-agenda.
133. See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
supra note 130.
134. See id. at 13,028–30.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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contributions made by the copyright owner and the webcasting service
with respect to creativity, technology, capital investment, cost and risk
137
in bringing the copyrighted work and the service to the public.

Comparing this standard with the § 801(b)(1) standard, it is clear
that the “willing buyer-willing seller” standard focuses more on the
potential risk of material loss on the part of the copyright holder,
whereas § 801(b)(1) instructs the CRB to consider the overall benefit of
broadcasting the copyright to the public at large. By interpreting the
standard in this way, the CRB loses sight of the potential benefits and
economic gains that might arise from webcasting, a service that can be
closely tailored to reach fans of a specific artist or subgenre of music.
Fortunately, Congress enacted the Webcaster Settlement Act
138
(“WSA”) in October 2008 to address this gap. The WSA allowed industrywide royalty rates to be agreed upon by private parties, rather than through
139
hearings conducted by the CRB. Within a year, SoundExchange entered
140
into one such agreement with a group of webcasters.
2.

Pureplay Webcasters Agreement for 2006 to 2015

In July of 2009, SoundExchange and “pureplay” webcasters reached
141
a settlement agreement under the WSA. A “pureplay” webcaster earns
142
its revenue primarily through its webcasting business. This Note
focuses on larger commercial webcasters as defined by the Pureplay
143
Webcasters Agreement.
By opting in to the Agreement, webcasters agree to pay a minimum
of $25,000 per year, which is credited toward the royalties owed during
144
that period. A commercial webcaster must also pay the greater of the
following: twenty-five percent of gross revenue or a per performance
145
fee. Per performance rates are as follows: $0.00102 in 2011; $0.00110 in
146
2012; $0.00120 in 2013; $0.00130 in 2014; and $0.00140 in 2015. These
137. Id. at 13,036.
138. See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (2008).
139. Id.
140. See David Oxenford, Pureplay Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter into Deal Under
Webcaster Settlement Act to Offer Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006-2015, Broadcast
Law Blog (July 7, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/07/articles/pureplay-webcasters-andsoundexchange-enter-into-deal-under-webcaster-settlement-act-to-offer-internet-radio-royalty-ratealternative-for-2006-2015.
141. See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.
34,796 (July 17, 2009) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114) [hereinafter Pureplay Webcasters Agreement].
142. See Pureplay Webcaster, SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com/serviceprovider/commercial-webcaster/pureplay-webcaster (last visited June 1, 2014).
143. A commercial webcaster is defined as having an annual gross revenue exceeding
$1.25 million. See Pureplay Webcasters Agreement, supra note 141 at 34,799. A small pureplay
webcaster is defined as having annual gross revenue less than $1.25 million. Id. at 34,797.
144. Id. at 34,799.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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new royalty rate determinations represent a discount from the previous
rates determined by the CRB; any pureplay webcasters who qualified
147
and elected into the agreement may pay these rates.
Tim Westergren, founder of Pandora, found some reprieve in the
Pureplay Webcasters Agreement, referring to the new rates as
148
“survivable.” However, while pleased with the stability and certainty
provided by the Agreement, Westergren lamented the fact that Internet
149
radio still paid far higher royalties than any other radio provider. In
2011, Pandora had 80 million registered users and streamed over 3.9
150
billion hours of music. From October 2010 through September 2011,
151
Pandora accumulated approximately $83.9 million in revenue. Of this
$83.9 million, Pandora paid $44.4 million in royalty fees—representing
152
nearly fifty-three percent of Pandora’s total revenue. This supports
Westergren’s seemingly annual complaint that Pandora spends over half
153
of its revenue paying royalties. When compared to the approximately
nine percent of revenue paid in royalties by satellite radio providers like
154
SiriusXM, there is clearly a disconnect between the royalty schemes
applied to the different digital music providers. It is unfair and shortsighted to expect Internet radio providers to be able to compete on such
an uneven playing field.

III. The Need for Fairness in Digital Radio
Given the data presented above, the different standards used to
determine royalty fees have a disparate impact on Internet radio
broadcasters. Maintaining this unfair approach for rate determination
stems partially from the music industry’s misplaced fear that Internet
radio serves as a substitute for the purchase of music, digital or
otherwise. The recently abandoned IRFA would have brought the rates
paid by webcasters in line with those paid by other digital radio
providers, and a similar approach should still be pursued.
147. See SoundExchange and “PurePlay” Webcasters Reach Unprecedented Experimental Rate
Agreement, SoundExchange (July 7, 2009), http://www.soundexchange.com/pr/soundexchange-andpureplay-webcasters-reach-unprecedented-experimental-rate-agreement.
148. Tim Westergren, Important Updates on Royalties, Pandora Blog (July 7, 2009),
http://blog.pandora.com/2009/07/07/important_updat_1.
149. Id.
150. Jesse Noyes, 10 Fast Facts About Pandora, Customer Think (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://customerthink.com/10_fast_facts_about_pandora.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Tim Westergren, Join Us to Stop the Discrimination Against Internet Radio, Pandora
Blog (Sept. 21, 2012), http://blog.pandora.com/2012/09/21/join-us. These expected royalties are only
those required under §§ 112 and 114; Pandora will still have to pay the musical composition copyright
to PROs like ASCAP; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
154. See Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite
Digital Audio Radio Services, supra note 129.
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A. Opposition to Internet Radio Is Misplaced
As previously noted, record companies hold the copyrights to most
155
sound recordings. These companies contend that webcasting works to
156
reduce album sales and threatens the music industry. In promoting this
theory, the recording industry focuses on two arguments: (1) users can
make digital copies of the streaming songs, and (2) Internet radio and
other webcasting platforms serve as a substitute for purchasing physical
157
albums or individual songs.
The first argument against webcasting can be easily defeated. First,
the process of copying a stream, also known as “stream-ripping,” requires
advanced technological skill and equipment that is not accessible to the
158
everyday user. Furthermore, these webcasters also have an incentive to
prevent “stream-ripping”: if anyone can simply rip the song off of their
webcast they will not have repeat customers and revenues will likely
drop. It seems unlikely that a vast majority of music seekers would adopt
such a complex technique to avoid paying $0.99 for a song.
The record executives’ fear that webcasting will replace digital
downloads or purchases of physical CDs certainly deserves more
attention than “stream-ripping.” Just this past year, digital music
purchases decreased for the first time since 2001, the year Apple launched
159
In fact, many record executives admitted that
the iTunes store.
advertising
and subscription-based webcasting services were
160
“cannibalizing” music sales. At the same time, Internet users streamed
161
audio and video files over fifty million times during the first half of 2013.
While record executives might cling to this decline in sales as a sign that
webcasting is ruining the music industry, a more objective person might
162
realize a potential changing of the guard in the music industry.
Webcasting presents an untapped resource of potential revenue
generation for record labels and recording artists. Unlike the glory days
of greasing the radio disc jockey’s palm to get an artist’s music on the air,
163
listeners in 2014 proactively seek new artists to follow. Given the
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media, 11 Tex.
Intell. Prop. L.J. 447, 450 (2003).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 450 n.8.
159. Christman, supra note 21.
160. Id.
161. Emily Steel, Streaming Services Take Toll on Digital Music Sales, Fin. Times (Jan. 3, 2014,
5:57 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fec604fc-7499-11e3-af50-00144feabdc0.html. Fifty million
streams represented a twenty-four percent growth over the same period in 2012. Id.
162. See id. Jim Donio, the President of the Music Business Association, thinks that streaming
music is likely to account for substantial revenue growth once the full-year numbers are available. Id.
163. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 58–59. Fisher describes a type of Wild West era of early radio
promotion in which record executives would compensate radio program managers with money,
prostitutes, and drugs just to ensure their artist would make it onto the air waves. Id.
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scarcity of radio frequencies, traditional broadcast radio stations are
confined to playing the most “popular” songs that will attract the widest
164
audience and drive up their advertising revenue. Internet radio, on the
other hand, enables users to tailor their musical preferences and seek out
the artists they prefer, eventually introducing them to similar artists they
165
might enjoy. While music fans may not be paying for digital music like
they used to, the fans are still paying for something. Instead of spending
ten dollars for a digital album or physical CD, listeners are paying a
166
monthly subscription for access to large music libraries. Spotify,
another prominent webcasting provider, has over six million paying
subscribers and has paid over one billion dollars in royalties to artists
167
since 2008. Clearly, there is still a great amount of money to be made,
and it is simply a matter of record labels adapting to a changing market
168
in order to take advantage of new opportunities.
In essence, Internet radio is acting as a sort of marketing channel for
169
artists who cannot get their music onto traditional radio stations. When
independent artists promote their music through the Internet, they are
170
more likely to reach their fans. More fans leads to more music

164. See Jackson, supra note 156, at 451.
165. See Walker, supra note 6. Pandora allows users to give a song a “thumbs up” or a “thumbs
down,” from which it can further curate a listener’s personal station. See Thumbs, Pandora,
http://help.pandora.com/customer/portal/articles/84832-thumbs (last visited June 1, 2014).
166. See Robert Cookson, Music Chiefs Put Faith in Digital Streaming Power, Fin. Times (Jan. 17,
2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/490e0242-7dd9-11e3-95dd-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
167. Id. In a response to critics, Spotify revealed that it pays an average of $0.007 per play in
royalties. See Spotify Reveals Artists Earn $0.007 per Stream, BBC News (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:24 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-25217353.
168. On January 21, 2014, Beats Electronics launched its own Internet radio service, Beats Music.
See Alex Pham, Beats Music: A Step-by-Step Walk Through, Billboard (Jan. 11, 2014, 2:26 PM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/5869545/beats-music-a-step-by-stepwalk-through. Beats Music allows users to curate a playlist based upon the genres they prefer and even
the social situations they find themselves in. Id. Beats Music is also considering giving artists access to
fan data so they may directly engage with the people listening to their music. Id. Beats Electronics has
said it is committed to paying every artist the same royalty, but has so far been silent on just how much
those royalties amount to. See Paul Resinkoff, Beats Music Promises to Pay Everyone the Same
Royalty Rate, Digital Music News (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/
2014/01/12/beatssamewage.
169. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Spotify CEO Daniel Ek Talks Royalties, Social and the Future,
Evolver.fm (Feb. 10, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://evolver.fm/2012/02/10/spotify-ceo-daniel-ek-talksroyalties-social-and-the-future. In his interview with Evolver.fm, Spotify CEO Daniel Ek describes
how users promote music by sharing it with their friends, while also generating royalty revenue for the
artist every time a song is played. Id.
170. In a recent interview, Dave Macklovitch, also known as Dave 1 of the band Chromeo, extols
the marketing potential of the Internet for independent artists. See Kev Geoghegan, Chromeo ‘Trying
to Work All Angles’ with New Album, BBC News (Feb. 3, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/entertainment-arts-25863073. The first single from Chromeo’s forthcoming album has been
streamed over 500,000 times in two weeks on Soundcloud, an Internet music streaming service. Id.
According to Dave 1, such promotional techniques are “part of being a modern group” and “it would
be ridiculous to sit back and build our success on radio.” Id.
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171

purchases or other royalty generating projects, which leads to a tour,
which might inspire other independent musicians to promote their art
through the Internet as well.
If webcasters could perform on more equal footing with their
satellite radio counterparts, record labels and musicians would have a
better chance to realize revenue from sound recording licensing than if
the webcasters crumbled under crippling royalty fees. By bringing the
royalties paid by Internet radio providers in line with those paid by their
satellite radio counterparts, webcasters will be able to compete fairly,
providing a strong revenue stream for record companies and other
parties with a copyright interest in digital music.
B. Internet Radio Fairness Act and a Missed Opportunity
In September 2012, Congressman Jason Chaffetz of Utah
172
introduced the IRFA. This bipartisan bill aimed to bring royalty rates
paid by webcasters in line with the rates paid by other digital radio
173
providers. In order to achieve this goal, the IRFA sought to amend
current copyright law so that the § 801(b)(1) standard would apply to all
digital radio royalty rates, regardless of whether the music derives from a
174
satellite or Internet radio station.
Despite support from Internet radio and traditional radio
heavyweights—Pandora and Clear Channel respectively—the IRFA has
175
essentially been abandoned. Representative Chaffetz allegedly lost
enthusiasm for the bill, and instead Pandora is apparently leaning toward
directly lobbying the CRB in preparation for the next round of webcaster
176
royalty rate determinations. Pandora might also consider engaging in
licensing deals with the record labels directly, effectively avoiding the
177
CRB and its royalty scheme. Despite its biggest supporter dropping out
of the race, the underlying goal of the IRFA to apply the § 801(b)(1)

171. Chromeo credits some of its success to licensing their music for use in video games. Id.
172. Boost Innovation, supra note 17.
173. David Oxenford, Chaffetz Bill Introduced in House of Representatives to Adopt 801(b)
Standard for Internet Radio Royalty Decisions of Copyright Royalty Board—What’s It All About?,
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rates expire after 2015. Id.
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standard to all digital radio platforms should still be realized so that
webcasters may compete on a level playing field.
Replacing the “willing buyer-willing seller” standard with the
§ 801(b)(1) standard was one of the most important aspects of the IRFA.
Webcasters, by their nature, are able to broadcast far more
178
“performances” than other digital broadcasters. Applying the “willing
buyer-willing seller” standard to Internet radio providers results in a
179
Given the ubiquity of webcasting
burdensome royalty obligation.
services, it is nearly impossible to imagine a logical “willing buyer-willing
seller” market lasting much longer. A more manageable royalty rate would
allow webcasters to grow and improve their services, thus attracting more
180
users and in turn increasing royalty fees and exposure for the artists.
By using the § 801(b)(1) standard, webcasters will only have to pay a
181
percentage of revenues comparable to their satellite counterparts. This
increase in available revenue will allow the webcasters’ stations to thrive,
thus making available a wide range of music genre stations across the
Internet. With such wide exposure, recording artists, musicians and
record companies will reach their target audience and music fans will be
able to discover and connect with the artists they enjoy.

Conclusion
Whether webcasting royalty rates are determined using the
§ 801(b)(1) standard, or a direct deal is struck between webcasters and
rights holders, it is most advantageous to the music industry for
webcasters to pay a percentage of revenues more in line with their
satellite counterparts. The current royalty rates are unsustainable and
will affect webcasters’ ability to operate in the future. Webcasters are not
in the business of providing illegal downloads or ruining the recording
industry; they simply want to continue providing their customers with
music that spans all nations, genres, and demographics. It is important
that webcasters are given the opportunity to continue reaching the
public, for the discovery of a new band might just provide the creative
spark needed to inspire the next generation’s legends to pursue their
musical dreams.
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